The inherent key escrow problem is one of the main reasons for the slow adoption of identity-based cryptography. The existing solution for mitigating the key escrow problem is by adopting multiple Private Key Generators (PKGs). Recently, there was a proposal that attempted to reduce the trust of the PKG by allowing a malicious PKG to be caught if he reveals the user's identity-based private key illegally. Nonetheless, the proposal does not consider that the PKG can simply decrypt the ciphertext instead of revealing the private key itself (in the case of identity-based encryption schemes). The aim of this paper is to present an escrow-free identity-based signature (IBS) scheme, in which the malicious PKG will be caught if it releases a signature on behalf of the user but signed by itself. We present a formal model to capture such a scheme and provide a concrete construction.
Introduction
The notion of identity-based cryptography was put forth by Shamir [22] . This notion was proposed to simplify the authentication of a public key by merely using an identity string as the public key. From the verifier's or the encryptor's point of view, only the identity of the other party is required. Hence, there is no necessity to ensure the validity of the public key. Due to this nice property, a series of identity-based schemes have been proposed, including identity-based signatures [22] , identity-based encryption [8] , hierarchical identity-based cryptography [15] and so forth. For identity-based signatures (IBS), there exists a comprehensive discussion conducted by Bellare et al. [5] . Galindo et al. [13] further extended the discussion to IBS with various additional properties, which has more practical applications.
In these identity-based cryptosystems, there is a trusted party called the private key generator (PKG) who generates the private key for each user identity. As the PKG generates and holds the private key for all users, a complete trust must be placed on the PKG. Nonetheless, this may not be desirable in a real-world scenario, where a malicious PKG can sell users' keys, sign messages or decrypt ciphertexts on behalf of users without being confronted in a court of law. This is known as the key escrow problem. This problem seems to be inherent in identity-based cryptosystems. Boneh and Franklin [8] proposed that employing multiple PKGs is a possible solution to the key escrow problem. The master private key is jointly computed by a number of PKGs, such that no single PKG has the knowledge of it. However, this approach requires an extra infrastructure and communication cost between users and different PKGs. A user needs to run the key extraction protocol with different PKGs by proving his identity to them. Furthermore, maintaining multiple independent PKGs for a commercially used infrastructure is a daunting task.
Some cryptosystems have been proposed to solve the key escrow problem. They use a "combination" of identity-based cryptography and the traditional public key cryptography, such as the certificateless cryptosystems [1] , the certificatebased cryptosystems [14] and the self-certificated cryptosystems [16] , in a non-trivial way. In these systems, a user possesses a user public key and a user private key, together with his identity-based private key computed by the PKG. The user private key protects the user from the key escrow problem. The PKG acts like a certificate authority (CA) who authenticates the user public key using his master private key. Unfortunately, these cryptosystems are no longer identity-based-the encryptor or the verifier has to know the user public key in addition to the user identity. Therefore, these schemes lost the original advantages of identity-based cryptography.
Girault [16] defined three levels of trust to the PKG:
-Level 1: The PKG can compute users' private keys and, therefore, can impersonate any user without being detected. Identity-based signature schemes are the examples. -Level 2: The PKG cannot compute users' private keys.
However, the PKG can still impersonate any user without being detected. Certificateless signature schemes are the examples. -Level 3: The PKG cannot compute users' private keys, and the PKG cannot impersonate any user without being detected. Certificate-based signature schemes and selfcertificated signature schemes are the examples.
The current schemes achieving level 2 or level 3 of trust are no longer identity based. It is an open problem to construct an identity-based signatures with level 2 or level 3 of trust, without publishing the user public key.
Recently, Goyal [17] proposed the concept of accountable authority identity-based encryption (A-IBE) to reduce the trust in the PKG and it was further strengthened by [2, 18] . In [17] , the PKG helps the user to compute his identitybased private key without knowing it. If the PKG computes another set of private key by himself and reveals it to other parties, this key will be different from the user's original private key with a high probability. Therefore, the PKG can be caught when revealing the private key and the user's original private key is the evidence. However, the malicious PKG is still able to sell a signed message or decrypted ciphertext instead, without being detected. This is clearly an issue that is not yet addressed in Goyal's model [17] . Goyal et al. [18] further proposed the concept of black-box A-IBE. In black-box A-IBE, if a PKG sells a decoder box which can decrypt ciphertexts with non-negligible probability, he will be caught in a trace algorithm. It is an open problem to construct a similar blaming mechanism in the IBS setting.
Our contributions
In this paper, we introduce the concept of escrow-free identity-based signatures to reduce the trust in the PKG. In this model, each signer has his own public key and private key. The PKG generates the identity-based private key for the signer with respect to the user public key (àla Goyal's approach [17] ). Then, the signer uses both private keys to sign a message. Therefore, the signer is protected against a malicious PKG. To verify the signature, it only requires the signer's identity and the message. This is the main difference between certificate-based signatures (CBS), certificateless signatures (CLS), self-certificated signatures (SCS) and our model. Their verification protocols require the signer's public key to verify. 1 Hence, our model mimics closely the original IBS in this regard, and solves the key escrow problem at the same time.
Our scheme achieves level 3 of trust to the PKG, which is the best in the model proposed by Girault [16] . Theoretically, the escrow-free IBS is more efficient than CBS, CLS and SCS since the user public key is not involved and is not sent to the verifier. In this paper, we give the first construction of the escrow-free IBS. When comparing with the multiple PKGs solution by Boneh and Franklin [8] , our scheme interacts with at most two authorities. While Boneh and Franklin's scheme interacts with a large number of authorities, the communication complexity of the their scheme is higher.
We then extend the escrow-free IBS to have an extra property called user public key anonymity. In CBS, CLS and SCS, user public keys are needed to verify a signature. Since the escrow-free IBS only use the identity to verify a signature, it is possible for the signature to be anonymous with respect to the user public key. We provide an additional security model to capture the user public key anonymity property and present a secure construction with anonymity.
Finally, we provide some generic transformations between the escrow-free IBS, CBS and CLS. We show that the escrowfree IBS can be constructed from CBS, and vice versa. We also show that CLS can be constructed from the escrow-free IBS. We give security proofs for these transformations. Since our escrow-free IBS has the highest level of trust (level 3), we can easily construct other related primitives like CBS and CLS from the escrow-free IBS. On the other hand, we have to strengthen the security model of CBS, in order to construct an escrow-free IBS from CBS. This shows that our security model of escrow-free IBS is stronger than the existing security model of CBS. I D is the identity, upk is the user public key, and W is the commitment of the user private key using the public key of the PKG
Backgrounds
We briefly review the pairings and some candidate hard problems that will be used later. Let G, G T be cyclic groups of prime order p, writing the group action multiplicatively. Let g be a generator of G.
DL problem. The Discrete Logarithm problem is that, given g, y ∈ G, to output x = log g y. We say that the ( , t)-DL assumption holds in G if no t time algorithm has the nonnegligible probability in solving the DL problem.
DBDH problem [8] . The decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem is that, given g, g a , g b , g c ∈ G and T ∈ G T for some randomly chosen a, b, c ∈ Z * p , to decide if T = e(g, g) abc . We say that the ( , t)-DBDH assumption holds in G if no t time algorithm has the non-negligible probability over half in solving the DBDH problem.
q-SDH problem [7] . The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman problem is that, given g, g α , . . . , g α q ∈ G for a randomly chosen α ∈ Z * p , to output a pair g 1 α+c , c where c ∈ Z * p . We say that the ( , t, q)-SDH assumption holds in G if no t time algorithm has the non-negligible probability in solving the q-SDH problem.
Security model for escrow-free identity-based signatures

Syntax
An escrow-free identity-based signature scheme has six polynomial-time algorithms, namely Setup, UserKeyGen, Extract, Sign, Verify, Blame.
Setup:
On input a security parameter 1 k , it generates the system parameter param, the master private key msk and the master public key mpk. -ϕ shows that σ is related to upk, and -the PKG's algorithm Blame p , with private input msk, fails to provide a public key upk , a joining proof P f and a transcript ρ, such that: -upk is related to σ , -P f shows the user's participation with respect to upk , and -ρ is the transcript of the extract algorithm with upk .
Otherwise, the judge outputs "upk".
There are four types of entities involved in the escrowfree identity-based signatures: users, the PKG, the judge, and a Trusted Third Party (TTP) who will certify the joining proof P f . 3 We assume that the PKG and the TTP do not collude. Otherwise, the malicious PKG can sign a message with respect to upk and the TTP can provide a fake joining proof P f . As a result, the malicious PKG cannot be caught by the Blame algorithm.
We also assume that the user and the TTP do not collude. Otherwise, the malicious user can sign a message using his identity-based private key and the TTP can intentionally disapprove the joining proof P f . As a result, the malicious user cannot be caught by the Blame algorithm.
Remark Notice that although the signature σ is signed using usk and an identity-based private key binded with upk, the verification of σ may not need upk. Similar to the standard identity-based signatures, the verification of σ only requires the identity ID.
Joining proof
The joining proof P f can be either an online proof or a proof in the real world. A Trusted Third Party (TTP) certifies the joining proof. For the online proof, it can consist of a certificate issued by some authority (TTP) with respect to upk, and a proof of knowledge with respect to upk. For the real-world proof, it can be the user's signature on an application form, or the photocopy of the user's documentation. The TTP will verify the user's signature or the user's documentation.
The joining proof P f is needed to protect both the PKG and the user in the Blame protocol. If there is no such proof: -a malicious PKG can generate sk ID,upk using any upk generated by himself and an honest user cannot show that upk is not his public key; -a malicious user can claim that the upk used in sk ID,upk is not his public key and frame an honest PKG.
The joining proof can be viewed as an authentication of user public key, which is separated from the identity-based private key issuing. Similar concepts can be found in "anonymous identity-based key issuing" [23] , where the duties of authentication and key issuing are separated to local registration authorities (LRA) and the PKG. Recently, Chow [12] proposed a new system architecture to realize "anonymous key issuing", by employing non-colluding identity-certifying authority (ICA) and PKG. However, these two systems only authenticate the user identity. If we modify the LRA or ICA to authenticate user public key as well, it can be used as a joining proof.
Correctness
Let sk ID,upk ← Extract(param, upk, ID) and (usk, upk) ← UserKeyGen(param). Denote σ ← Sign(param, usk, sk ID,upk , m). Then We define the verification correctness as follows:
We also define the blaming correctness as follows:
if Extract(param, upk, ID) was run between the user and the PKG. On the other hand,
if Extract(param, upk, ID) has never been run between the user and the PKG.
Unforgeability
The security model for unforgeability captures the attack from the outsider to forge a signature when the PKG is honest. The adversary can obtain signatures of an honest user and can get the identity-based private key of any identity except the challenge identity. We have the following game for unforgeability: 
PKG non-frameability
The security model for PKG non-frameability captures the attack from a malicious user having an identity-based private key that wants to frame an honest PKG. If the attacker without any identity-based private key wants to frame an honest PKG, he must first forge a valid signature. Since this scenario has been captured in the model of unforgeability, we only consider the case that a malicious user, who already obtains an identity-based private key, wants to frame an honest PKG. We have the following game for PKG non-frameability: 
PKG.
Definition 2 An escrow-free IBS scheme is ( , t, q e )-secure against PKG non-frameability if there is no t time adversary winning the above game with probability at least with q e queries to KEO.
User non-frameability
The security model for user non-frameability captures the attack from a malicious PKG that wants to frame an honest user. We do not model the case where the PKG maliciously generates the system parameters (e.g. the choice of elliptic curve). Similar approach can also be found in [12] , where they also consider the attack from malicious PKG without controlling the system parameters. We have the following game for user non-frameability:
1. The challenger C gives param to the adversary A. A gives a master public key mpk to C. C runs the algorithm (usk * , upk * ) ← UserKeyGen(param). C gives the user public key upk * and a joining proof P f * to A.
2.
A is allowed to query the following oracles adaptively: Definition 3 An escrow-free IBS scheme is ( , t, q j , q s )-secure against user non-frameability if there is no t time adversary winning the above game with probability at least with q j and q s queries to J O and SO respectively.
Generic construction
We present a generic construction of escrow-free IBS from standard signatures. This is similar to the construction of certificate-based IBS in [5] . In this construction, the identitybased private key consists of a signature of a user's identity and his public key. The signature includes the partial signature (which is signed on the message m with the user private key), the user public key and the identity-based private key. This may sound paradoxical since the purpose of identitybased cryptography is to avoid the certification of user public key, but certification here refers to a technique, not a PKI.
Notice that the user public key is a part of identity-based signature. Since the verifier needs to know only the PKG public key and identity of the signer, this scheme is identity-based. Bellare et al. in [5] used this concept to construct a generic construction of identity-based signature. The same approach is also discussed in [13] .
Our scheme
Suppose there is a standard digital signature scheme SS = (SKg, Sign, Vf) which is unforgeable against chosen message attack (UF-CMA), we construct our escrow-free IBS scheme as follows: Setup: On input the security parameter 1 k , it outputs (mpk, msk) ← SKg(1 k ). The system parameter param is just the security parameter 1 k .
UserKeyGen: On input param, the user obtains (upk, usk) ← SKg(1 k ).
Extract: The PKG algorithm Extract p has input (param, upk, ID, msk). The user algorithm Extract u has input (param, upk, ID, usk). The user computes s ← Sign usk (ID) and sends (s, ID, upk, P f ) to the PKG. The PKG checks if 1 ← Vf upk (ID, s) and P f is a joining proof. If they are correct, then the P K G computes the identitybased private key sk ID,upk ← Sign msk (ID||upk). The PKG saves the join transcript ρ = (s, ID, upk, P f ) and then sends sk ID,upk to the user. The user accepts the private key if 1 ← Vf mpk (ID||upk, sk ID,upk ).
Sign: On input param, usk, sk ID,upk and a message m, the user computes σ 1 ← Sign usk (m||ID). The user outputs the signature σ = (σ 1 , upk, sk ID,upk ).
Verify: On input param, mpk, ID, m and σ = (σ 1 , upk, sk ID,upk ), it returns 1 if 1 ← Vf upk (m||ID, σ 1 ) and 1 ← Vf mpk (ID||upk, sk ID,upk ).
Blame: On common input param, mpk, ID, upk, m and σ = (σ 1 , upk, sk ID,upk ), the user asks the judge to blame the PKG. The judge asks the PKG to provide a transcript ρ = (s, ID, upk, P f ). If 1 ← Vf upk (ID, s) and P f is a valid joining proof, the judge outputs upk. Otherwise, the judge outputs P K G.
Security proofs
The correctness of the scheme is straightforward. We state the security of the above construction in the following theorems.
Theorem 1 The scheme is unforgeable if SS is a UF-CMA secure signature scheme.
Proof Assume there is a ( , t, q e , q s )-adversary A. We will construct another PPT B that uses A to forge a signature of SS with probability at least and in time at most t.
Setup. B runs the SS simulator twice and obtains two public keys pk 1 and pk 2 . B gives A the master public key mpk = pk 1 and the honest user public key upk = pk 2 .
Oracles Proof Assume there is a ( , t, q s )-adversary A. We will construct another PPT B that uses A to forge a signature of SS with probability at least and in time at most t. Setup. B runs the SS simulator and obtains a public key pk. B gives A the master public key mpk = pk.
Oracles Simulation. The simulation of the key extraction oracle is the same as that of Theorem 1.
Output. Finally A outputs a signature σ * = (σ * 1 , upk * , sk * ) for a message m * and an identity ID * . A blames the PKG with a public key upk * .
-If (upk, ID, ·, ·) was not successfully queried in the key extraction oracle, B returns sk * as the forgery for the message ID * ||upk * with respect to the public key mpk.
-Otherwise, B tries to reply to the judge with the transcript ρ = (s , ID * , upk * , P f ) with respect to the blame from A. A wins the game if either P f is not a valid joining proof or s is not a valid signature. However, it is not possible since the transcript is checked during the oracle query. 
Theorem 3 The scheme is user non-frameable if
User public key anonymity
In the previous section, we propose a generic construction of escrow-free IBS. However, the user public key is included in the signature. Therefore it is similar to the certificate-based signatures to some extent. In some applications, it may not be desirable to let the verifier knowing the user public key (not the identity only). For example, assume a student has a long-term user public key. He may apply for an identitybased private key for his student ID from the university. He may also apply for an identity-based private key for his email address from the internet service provider. When a user uses the escrow-free IBS, he may not want the signatures for two different identities to be linked to the same user public key. In order to construct an escrow-free IBS scheme which is fully identity-based, we require that the signature contains no information about the user public key. We call this additional property as "user public key anonymity". 4 In this section, we define the additional security model for the user public key anonymity.
Security model for anonymity
The security model for user public key anonymity captures the attack that wants to distinguish if a signature is signed by an honest user with a user public key upk. The attacker is given the master private key, but cannot query any join oracle. In order words, the attacker can retrieve the master private key from the real PKG, but not the join transcript from the real PKG. The users joining the real PKG will have anonymity even if the master private key is stolen. We have the following game for anonymity:
C gives param, the master public key mpk, the master private key msk and two user public keys upk 0 , upk 1 to the adversary A. Definition 4 An identity-based signature scheme is ( , t, q s )-secure against anonymity if there is no t time adversary winning the above game with probability at least with q s queries to SO.
Remark
The security model for key-privacy or anonymity in traditional public key encryption was proposed by Bellare et al. [4] . In this section, we follow their notion of "indistinguishability of keys under chosen-ciphertext attacks" and adopt the indistinguishability game into our IBS setting.
The main difference between Bellare et al.'s model and our model is that the challenge user private keys and the user public keys are not chosen by the adversary in our model. It is because our Blame algorithm requires that the PKG is able to show that "the upk is related to the signature σ " if σ is signed by the corresponding usk. If the msk, usk 0 and usk 1 are known to the adversary, he can generate the join transcript by himself and checks if upk 0 or upk 1 is related to the challenge signature σ * . It will break the anonymity. Therefore, in our anonymity model, the adversary is not given usk 0 and usk 1 . The adversary is given the signing oracle for usk 0 and usk 1 instead.
Construction with user public key anonymity
In this section, we provide a concrete construction with user public key anonymity. Our construction for escrow-free IBS is based on the signature schemes from Boneh and Boyen [7] and Boneh et al. [9] . We also use the "signatures of knowledge" (SoK) notion from Chase and Lysyanskaya [10] .
Intuition
We use the signature scheme from Boneh and Boyen [7] as the identity-based private key. Suppose the master private key is α and the master public key is g α . For a user with private key x and public key y = g x , his identity-based private key is A where
and g, u, v are a generator of G.
For the signing protocol, the part of the signature useful for the blame protocol is derived from Boneh et al. [9] . Denote this part as S and we have
where m is the message. The the signing protocol becomes:
Our scheme
We give the detailed construction of the escrow-free IBS with anonymity. Setup: The algorithm first chooses a random prime p of bit size (k). Let G, G T be a bilinear group of order p and a pairingê : G×G → G T . It also chooses generators g, u, v ∈ G. It picks collision resistant hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} * → Z * p for hashing the identity string, and H 2 : {0, 1} * → G for hashing the message. It also chooses generators g 0 , g 1 , g 2 ∈ G used for the signature of knowledge. The system parameter  param is (ê, G, G T , p, g, u, v, g 0 , g 1 , g 2 , H 1 , H 2 ) .
The PKG randomly selects his master private key α ∈ Z * p . He computes the master public key g a = g α .
UserKeyGen: The user randomly selects his user private key x ∈ Z * p . He computes y = g x as his user public key.
Extract: The user calculates v = v x . He also computes a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof 5 of x with respect to v and v (we omit the details of the NIZK proof for discrete logarithm for simplicity). He sends v , ID, y, a joining proof P f and the NIZK proof to the PKG. The PKG checks the validity of P f, . If so, the PKG computes:
where i = H 1 (ID) and returns A to the user. The PKG stores the transcript ρ = (v , , ID, y, P f ). The user accepts the private key A if
Sign: The user signs a message m with the user private key x and the identity-based private key A. He computes the signature of knowledge (SoK):
The SoK is specified as follows. The user randomly chooses s, r, r 2 ∈ Z * p , R 1 ∈ G and computes: 
Verify: Upon input a signature σ for a message m and an identity ID, it computes: t 1 , t 2 , τ 0 , . . . , τ 4 , m, mpk, ID) . Otherwise, it outputs 0.
Blame: On common input the master public key mpk, an identity ID, a message m, a signature σ , a user public key y, the user with user private key x first computes ϕ = v x .
The user sends ϕ to the judge as the blame request. The judge checks if σ = (t 0 , t 1 , t 2 , c, z 0 , Z 1 , z 2 , S) is a valid signature and:
If they are not equal, the judge returns "upk". 5 Although v can be used to prove the knowledge of x via pairing, we need the extractor of the NIZK proof to obtain x in the security proof.
Otherwise, the judge requests the PKG to provide a transcript ρ = (v , , ID, y , P f ). If P f is a valid joining proof for y and
If they are equal, the judge returns "upk". Otherwise, the judge returns "PKG".
Remark
Some pairing operations can be pre-computed, such aŝ
). Therefore the Sign protocol only requires one pairing operation and the Verify protocol requires 4 pairing operations.
Security proofs
The correctness of the signature scheme is straightforward. We first prove that the SoK protocol above is a secure signature of knowledge. We use the game-based definition (SimExt-secure) in [10] . Chase and Lysyanskaya [10] proved the equivalence of the game-based definition and the UC framework definition.
Lemma 1 The SoK protocol above is a SimExt-secure signature of knowledge of a witness (A, x).
Proof The correctness of the signature of knowledge scheme is straightforward.
For simulatability, after the simulator randomly picks A and x to compute t 0 , t 1 , t 2 , S, he picks a challenge c ∈ Z * p and also z 0 , z 2 ∈ Z * p , Z 1 ∈ G. Then compute:
Therefore the transcript above is simulatable.
For extraction, we now show that there exists an extractor for A and x. Assume there are two transcripts with the same commitment (t 0 , t 1 , t 2 , τ 0 , . . . , τ 4 ) and different challenges c, c and responses
Then, we have
From τ 3 and τ 4 , we have the following relations:
Therefore we extract (Ã,x) that satisfy the required relations. .) A sends (v , ID i , y i , P f, 
Theorem 4 The scheme is ( , t, q e , q s )-unforgeable if the ( , t , q)-SDH assumption holds in
, and returned (A * , d * ) as the solution to the q-SDH problem. Probability and Time Analysis. We consider the two events that B could fail:
-Event E i : For the i-th query to the KEO,
Notice that the event ∩ q e i=1 ¬E i implies ¬E * , since the model requires that the challenge identity has never been submitted to KEO. Hence, E * implies ∪ q e i=1 E i . Therefore the probability of B wins is at least Pr[E * ] = 1/(q h 1 + q e ). By the reset lemma [6] , the probability that B solves the q-SDH problem is ≥ ( /(q h 1 + q e ) − 1/ p) 2 .
For each key extraction oracle query, B runs O(1) exponentiation in G. For each signing oracle query, B runs O(1) exponentiation in G and O(1) pairing computation. The probability and the running time of the algorithms are similar to that of Theorem 4.
Theorem 5 The scheme is ( , t, q e )-PKG non-frameable if the ( , t , q)-SDH assumption holds in
Theorem 6 The scheme is ( , t, q j , q s )-user non-frameable if the ( , t )-DL assumption holds in G in the random oracle model, where:
where ν and τ are the time for computing exponentiation in G and pairing respectively.
Proof Assume there is a ( , t, q j , q s )-adversary A. We will construct another PPT B that makes use of A to solve the DL problem in G with probability at least and in time at most t . B is given a DL problem instance (g,ȳ) . Setup. B generates the public parameters for verifying , randomly chooses generators g 0 , g 1 , g 2 ∈ G and computes v = g ν for some random ν ∈ R Z p . B honestly generates the rest of param and sends it to the adversary A.
A gives a master public key mpk to B. B sets the user public key upk * =ȳ and generates a joining proof P f * for upk * . B gives upk * and P f * to A.
Oracles Simulation. B simulates the oracles as follow: (H oracle.) H 1 , H 2 and H 3 are simulated as normal random oracles.
(User Join oracle.) Upon input ID, B runs the simulator of the proof of knowledge to obtains a valid . B sends (v =ȳ ν , ID, upk * , P f * , ) to A. A returns sk ID,upk .
(Signing oracle.) B runs the simulator of the signature of knowledge as in lemma 1 to obtain a valid signature σ . B returns σ to A. B fails and exits if the challenge c is already set in the H 2 query.
Output. Finally A outputs a signature σ . B rewinds and obtains another signature σ . Similar to lemma 1, B can extractx and returns it as the solution to the DL problem.
The probability and the time analysis are straightforward.
Theorem 7 The scheme is ( , t, q s )-anonymous if the ( , t )-DBDH assumption holds in the random oracle model, with:
where q h is the number of query to the H 2 oracle, δ and τ are the time for computing exponentiation in G and pairing respectively.
Proof Assume there is a ( , t, q s )-adversary A. We will construct another PPT B that makes use of A to solve the DBDH problem with probability at least and in time at most t . B is given a DBDH problem instance (g, g a , g b , g c , T ). Setup. B randomly selects x 0 , x 1 ∈ Z p . He computes upk 0 = g ax 0 and upk 1 = g ax 1 Probability and time analysis. The probability of B exits in the challenge phase is 1−1/q h 2 + q s . By the reset Lemma [6] , the probability is ≥ ( /q h 2 + q s − 1/ p) 2 .
For each signing oracle query, B runs O(1) exponentiation in G and O(1) pairing computation.
Comparison
In this section, we provide a comparison of our scheme against the existing schemes. Denote (s, P) as a pair of private key and public key computed by the user. Denote (d, I ) as a pair of identity-based private key and identity computed by the PKG. Let (α, β) be a pair of private key and public key of the PKG. Let c be the private key of a certificate authority. Let Sig a (b) be a signature of message b using the private key a. Let Com a (b) be a commitment of the value a using the public parameter b. We compare the public information that a verifier needs to know (except β), the private keys used by the signer and the witness to link the identity with the public key. We use W to represent a witness which is different from the above parameters.
Notice that the certificateless signatures, the certificatebased signatures and the self-certificated signatures aim to resolve the key escrow problem. Nonetheless, these schemes are no longer identity-based since the user public key P has 
Our scheme in Sect. 4
Our Scheme in Sect. 6
been introduced into the public information. On the contrary, our scheme in Sect. 6 is the only scheme that solves this problem while staying at the framework of identity-based cryptography in a strict sense. However, the price we have to pay is to include a joining proof involved in the extraction protocol.
On the other hand, our generic construction in Sect. 4 provides a more efficient solution than our scheme in Sect. 6. The signature of the escrow-free IBS in Sect. 4 only consists of two standard signatures and a user public key. The computational cost of signing is the same as signing one standard signature; the computational cost of verifying is the same as verifying two standard signatures. It is as efficient as the generic IBS scheme in [5] .
Generic conversions
In this section, we will show a generic conversion between the escrow-free identity-based signatures and other cryptographic primitives. We first define some notions in the escrow-free identity-based signatures (EF-IBS) that will be used in this section.
-In the user key generation protocol, we define f as an one way function such that upk = f (usk). -In the extract protocol, the identity-based private key sk ID,upk is a (one way) function of upk, ID and msk. Therefore we define a relation R mpk such that (sk ID,upk , upk, ID) ∈ R mpk , which means that sk ID,upk can be verified by using upk and ID, with the master public key mpk. -In the signing protocol, it outputs a signature σ , which includes a part S which will be used in the blame protocol. -In the blame protocol, a user with user public key upk first runs the Blame u protocol by providing to the judge a blame request ϕ with respect to a message m and a sig-nature σ . The judge uses a part of the signature S ∈ σ to check the validity of ϕ. We define a function f such that S = f (param, ID, m, upk, ϕ) when a user successfully blames the PKG by Blame u . On the contrary, if a user signs the message m, then S = f (param, ID, m, upk, ϕ).
Conversion to certificate-based signatures
We first show the conversion from escrow-free identity-based signatures to certificate-based signatures (CBS). The security for the certificate-based signatures defined by Kang et al. [20] consists of two games between the challenger and the adversary. The Game 1 of the certificate-based signatures is the same as the simplified version of our unforgeability game, without letting the adversary to play as the malicious CA. The Game 2 of the certificate-based signatures is the same as the simplified version of our non-frameability game. Li et al. [21] proposed a stronger model for the certificate-based signatures to handle the "key replacement attack". We show the conversion from EF-IBS to CBS, where the notions for CBS is borrowed from [21] .
- 
-ϕ is a valid blame request according to the Blame EF−IBS j protocol.
Otherwise, it outputs 0.
We prove the security of the above CBS scheme in the security model from Li et al. [21] . For the complete treatment of the security model for CBS, we refer the readers to [21] . , upk) . The user provides his user public key upk and a blame request ϕ to the judge. If upk = upk , the judge outputs "upk ". Otherwise, the judge asks the PKG to provide the join transcript ρ of upk. The judge returns "PKG" if the PKG fails to do so. Otherwise, the judge outputs "upk ".
In order to prove the security of EF-IBS, we have to strengthen the security model of CBS and use the CBS schemes secure in the strengthened model. In the security model from [21] , it only considers the attack for replacing the honest user public key to the adversary's chosen one. In our security model, we consider the attack for replacing the user public key or the identity of an honest user.
In the security model from [21] , their CertGen oracle only allows the adversary to choose the identity, which associates with a fixed user public key. Therefore the adversary cannot request certificates for another identity with the public keys returned from the UserKeyGen oracle or any public key generated by the adversary. However, similar request is allowed in our EF-IBS Extraction oracle. Therefore, in this section we denote Game 1' as the CBS game 1 in the strengthened model, which allows CertGen CBS (ID, upk) and Sign CBS (ID, m, upk) For user non-frameability, we also have to strengthen the security model from [21] . The security model of [21] allows the challenger to know the master private key. Our model assumes that the master public key is generated by the adversary and the challenger does not know the master private key. To strengthen the security model for CBS, the adversary is given the param only in Setup and gives the master public key mpk to the challenger. Therefore, in this section we denote Game 2' as the CBS game 2 in the strengthened model, with the signing oracle is the same as that in Game 1'. Notice that the concrete construction from [21] is secure in our strengthened model.
Theorem 12
If the CBS scheme is secure against Game 2' adversary A 2 under the adaptive chosen message and chosen identity attack, then the above EF-IBS scheme is secure against user non-frameability.
Proof Assume there exists an adversary A winning the user non-frameability game. We can construct an algorithm B which can win the Game 2' of the CBS scheme.
Setup. First, B is given the param of the CBS scheme from the Game 2'. B also sets zpk as the public parameters of the proof of knowledge protocol. He forwards param = (param , zpk) to A. A returns a master public key mpk to B and B forwards it to the CBS simulator. B queries the UserKeyGen Oracle of the CBS simulator with input a random identity ID . B obtains a public key upk * from the oracle. B runs the simulator of the proof of knowledge protocol to obtain * for upk * . B gives the user public key upk * and the joining proof * to A.
Oracles Simulation. B simulates the oracles as follow: (Signing oracle.) On input a message m and ID, B queries SignOracle CBS (m, ID, upk * ). B forwards the output to A.
(User Join oracle.) Upon input ID, B runs the simulator of the proof of knowledge to obtains a valid with respect to upk * . B returns to A. A gives an identity-based private key sk ID,upk to B.
Output. Finally A outputs (σ * , m * , ID * ). As (m * , ID * ) has never been submitted to the signing oracle, B returns (m * , σ * , ID * ) as the forgery to the CBS Game 2'.
Conversion to certificateless signatures
Hu et al. [19] proposed a generic composition of certificateless signatures which is based on a standard signature scheme and an identity-based signature scheme. They proved that the scheme is secure against Type I and Type II adversary, provided that the standard signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attack; and the identitybased signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against chosen message and identity attack. Au et al. [3] proved that this scheme is also secure in their "malicious-but-passive" PKG model. Applying the same idea as in [19] , we can construct a certificateless signature scheme from a standard signature scheme and an EF-IBS scheme. The resulting scheme is secure in the "malicious-but-passive" PKG model.
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced the concept of escrow-free identity-based signatures to solve the key escrow problem in identity-based signature. We proposed an extra user public key anonymity property to escrow-free identity-based signatures and proposed a concrete construction. Our construction solves the open problem of key escrow in identity-based signatures, without requiring multiple PKGs. Our scheme is the first to achieve level 3 of trust of the PKG in Girault's model [16] , in the identity-based setting. Furthermore, we presented some generic constructions between escrowfree identity-based signatures, certificate-based signatures and certificateless signatures.
